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I.   Libertas Ecclesiae, Not Something Else 
 Once upon a time I took a tour of the Supreme Court of the United States.  When the guileless 
intern conducting the tour reached the point at which she was charged to disclose the function of judicial 
opinions, this is what she said: “Dissents are opinions where the minority explains how the majority’s 
opinion is in bad taste” (emphasis added).  Bad taste is exactly what mention of the liberty of the Church, 
libertas Ecclesiae, is widely thought to exemplify in the polite company of contemporary academic and 
popular celebration of “religious freedom.”2 Mention of “the Church” -- especially of her freedom and 
what that freedom is for -- imports unwelcome images of essence, organic growth, tradition, final causes, 
and authority, not to mention the Inquisition and perhaps even Christ the King of the universe.  Content-
free commitment to “religion,” meanwhile, appeals effortlessly to modern man’s preference for the 
                                                                
1   John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  I 
am grateful to Steve Smith and Larry Alexander for the invitation to participate in the Center for Law and 
Religion’s conference on “The Liberty of the Church” and to so many conference participants for their 
helpful engagement with my paper, and especially Professor Tom Smith, of the University of San Diego 
Law School, whose formal commentary on the paper was subtle and insightful.  I thank Brian McCall and 
Michael J. White for their extensive and acute comments on an early draft of the paper.   
2   Conspicuous exceptions include Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911412, Richard W. Garnett, The 
Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 59 (2007), and Michael J. White, Religion and the Common 
Good, 12 THE JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE STUDIES 27 (2002).  In his contribution to this conference, 
Garnett described libertas Ecclesiae as a “mood” that the courts should adopt.  As I said at the conference 
itself, I doubt that the One whose Mystical Body the Church is would reduce her liberty to the status of a 
“mood,” but lawyers have lawyerly ways of saying things, and I greatly value Garnett’s contribution.  
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formless.  The popular favorite in this age of surveys and game shows is “religious freedom,” no matter 
the arbitrariness ineluctably involved in specifying a generic phenomenon called “religion.”3 
Is it just possible -- it remains an open question -- that at a conference verily dedicated to 
exploring libertas Ecclesiae it will be considered, if not in good taste, at least not in bad taste to start with 
the liberty of the Church?  Or will it be considered socially unacceptable -- “intolerant,” even -- to 
expound the concept of the liberty of the Church in its own right, that is, as understood by the Catholic 
Church with respect to herself, which, after all, is where the concept originated?  A further question is 
whether any possible largesse will extend to my defense of that understanding.  A still further question is 
whether my additional argument -- that an adequate conception of the libertas Ecclesiae is predicated 
upon an acceptance of the concrete implications of the social kingship of Christ -- will turn out to be a 
bridge too far, even for those committed to a generous measure of what counts as good taste.  
The point, though, is that taste is no guide in matters of jurisprudence, let alone in theology.  No 
matter where you are or where you wish to go, the only sure guide is the truth.  Serious attention to 
libertas Ecclesiae cannot but flirt with the truth.  Not accidentally, truth is the first casualty of the 
inexorable but dubious logic of “religious freedom.”       
 
 
II.  The Church, Not Just Another Group 
“Religious freedom,” as it is commonly understood today and celebrated, refers to individuals 
and, sometimes, groups acting according to (sincerely?) held beliefs, irrespective of the truth or falsity of 
those beliefs, subject only to the commonsensical limit of not violating the “public order” (as opposed to 
the “common good,” a point to which we shall return).4  The “right” to such liberty and to its juridical 
protection is defended on many, varied, and much-vaunted grounds, especially the avoidance of social 
discord and so-called “wars of religion.”5  Anyone who has read John Rawls, for example, knows how 
solemnly it is said by the those who are wise in the eyes of the world that the price of keeping the peace is 
ruling truth inadmissible as a criterion for determining what freedom to permit and what “freedom” to 
deny.  The constitutional (and statutory and regulatory) bracketing of truth claims in the name of 
protecting “religious freedom” does not officially deny the truth of the Church’s claim on behalf of her 
own liberty, of course.  It suffices for the strategy’s efficacy that it render the claim irrelevant by situating 
the Church as just one among as many groups of (sincere?) believers as can be counted, or, as is more 
likely under current constitutional jurisprudence, recognizing the aggregate rights of the individuals who 
happen to be her members.6   
                                                                
3   Ironically, then, I have some sympathy with the question that forms the title of Brian Leiter’s recent 
book, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012).    
4 For a telling example of what is involved in arriving at a legal definition of “religion” and the place of 
sincerity therein, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 141-56, 160-76, 231-32 (2000).  See also KENT GREENAWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE 
EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 109-56 (2006).  For an historical account of the problem, see BRAD S. GREGORY, THE 
UNINTENDED REFORMATION: HOW A RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY 74-128, 167-76 (2012). 
5   On the nation-building reasons for what are inaccurately styled “wars of religion,” see WILLIAM T. 
CAVANAUGH, THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE: SECULAR IDEOLOGY AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN CONFLICT (2009). 
6   Hosana-Tabor is not to the contrary, for it provides an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional 
bar. “We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar. That is because the issue presented by the exception is ‘whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,’ not whether the court has ‘power to hear [the] case.’ Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 4–5) (internal quotation marks omitted).” Hosana-Tabor Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. __ n.4 (2012).  The significance of the constitutional limit’s being an “affirmative defense” rather than a jurisdictional bar is unmistakable as Mark Strasser has seen, though from what I regard as the wrong point of view.  See MARK STRASSER, ON MAKING THE ANOMALOUS MORE ANOMALOUS, available at Bepress.  
Cf. Greg Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS 
 3 
 This, though, the Church does not and cannot accept, for it is inconsistent with the Church’s self-
understanding of her nature.  To assimilate the Church to other groups or to dissolve her into her 
members is to de-nature the Church, as Heinrich Rommen explains: 
 
[T]here is no avoiding the nature and self-understanding of the Church, if the problem of Church 
and State should be approached.  Otherwise the term “Church” would stand only for utterly 
private opinions by private individuals in that sphere of irrational feelings and unscientific 
imagination which for the secularist agnostic is religion.  And it is clear that upon such 
suppositions it would follow that the political authority has exclusive and plenary competency to 
judge about the compatibility of such a religion with the policy and the public order of the state.  
The consequence of such thinking is the abolition of the Church-State problem by the complete 
elimination of the Church.7 
 
It is a paradoxical fact that in contemporary culture, the Church must insist upon the socio-juridical 
relevance of the truth itself as a very condition of her insisting upon the particular truth about herself.  
And, irrespective of culture and time, the Church must insist upon the truth about herself not because to 
do so is, say, an expression of the collective will of the faithful or of the hierarchy, but because “[t]he 
Church is ‘founded by Christ; therefore it is juridically a ‘foundation,’ not a corporation, and its 
constitution, its fundamental law, is given directly by God and not ordained by the people.”8  This is the 
Church’s self-understanding, and any honest consideration of the relationship between Church and state 
must begin by first acknowledging that understanding for what it is, even as a condition of ultimately 
rejecting it.  To acknowledge it, however, is to set some of the terms of the debate, for an act of popular 
will is a transparently insufficient reason to contravene the divine will.       
 None of the foregoing purports to settle the exact terms of the relationship between Church and 
state, of course. The state is a notoriously changeable and changing institution, and inevitably so -- though 
within certain limits established by nature and by supernature.9  History demonstrates that the Church is 
familiar with a wide range of relationships between herself and another equally wide-ranging spectrum of 
civil ruling authorities, some more adequate than others.  My point, though, is that any potentially 
adequate analysis on the level of concrete historical development must start with the Church’s self-
understanding, not with what the philosophers have always already said in order to limit or eliminate the 
Church.  If today the Church defends “religious freedom,” she does so as an exercise of her own 
antecedent mandate and consequent freedom to be the Church and thus to teach the human person who 
he is and who he is called to be.  Any religious freedom the Church teaches, however, cannot be 
inconsistent with her self-understanding or her relationship with her Founder and His divine will.   
I will take the precaution of observing here that to give priority to the Church and to Christ is not 
to bless the coercion of the unbaptized by the baptized.  The Church does not approve -- indeed she 
vehemently denies the legitimacy of -- coercing the unbaptized into “believing” the Catholic faith.  
Nothing whatsoever in the Church’s self-understanding anticipates a world in which Catholics force non-
Catholics to become Catholics.  But tolerance, of which much will be needed in the world of today, does 
not work by eliding truth and error.  The latter work is begun by indifferentism, which is close cousin to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               JOURNAL, 43 (2008) (defending a subject-matter jurisdictional position).  See also Michael Helfand, 
Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2141510. 
7   Heinrich Rommen, Church and State, THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 321, 322 (1950). 
8   Id.  
9   “The Church’s end and constitution are absolute, always the same, above civilizations and historical 
periods. . . .The Church’s activity extends into the ‘World.’ . . . .  In each civilization and era of history the 
‘idea’ of ‘the’ State finds expression in concrete form, for example, monarchy or democracy, with a Bill of 
Rights.  Thus there is produced beyond the abstract Church-State relationship on the abstract-general 
level a particular concrete Church-State relationship problem which requires its own concrete answer 
without the sacrifice of the perennial principles governing Church-State relations.”  Rommen, supra note 7, 
at 323. (emphasis added). 
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“religious freedom” in its common acceptation.  To honor the liberty of the Church is, in the words of John 
Courtney Murray, S.J., to recognize that  
 
the advent of Christ the King, the promulgation of the New Law and the supernatural statute of 
the Church . . .  involved a certain dislocation of the natural order, a diminution of the stature 
and scope which the political power would have possessed in another, purely natural 
dispensation.10 
 
The fact of the Church changes the natural world by subordinating it to a “supernatural statute.”  This is 
the stuff of worldly scandal, not the product of “neutral public reason.”       
 
 
 
III.  The Problematics and Hermeneutics of Vatican II 
 
 Any discussion of the contemporary Catholic understanding of the libertas Ecclesiae must take as 
its point of departure the text of Dignitatis humanae, the Second Vatican Council’s “Declaration on 
Religious Liberty,” promulgated in 1965 at the conclusion of the Council.11  The most contentiously 
debated document of the entire Council, Dignitatis has been celebrated ever since by those who regard it 
as having worked what in Catholic theology is known as a development of doctrine.12  The matter of that 
alleged development is the human person’s right to “religious freedom” in public.  The interpretive 
difficulties that attend ascertaining exactly what Dignitatis teaches on the question of individual religious 
freedom are impressive, and will tax us considerably as we proceed.  It is beyond dispute, however, that 
“whereas Dignitatis proceeds cautiously on other questions,” on the matter of the libertas ecclesiae the 
document is “unusually loquacious.”13  Here, from Article 13 of Dignitatis, is its central statement on the 
liberty of the Church: 
  
Among the things which concern the good of the Church and indeed the welfare of society here 
on earth – things therefore which are always and everywhere to be kept secure and defended 
against all injury – this is certainly preeminent, namely, that the Church should enjoy that full 
measure of freedom which her care for the salvation of men requires.  This freedom is sacred, 
because the only only-begotten Son endowed with it the Church which He purchased with His 
blood.  It is so much the property of the Church that to act again it is to act against the will of 
God.  The freedom of the Church is the fundamental principle [principium fundamentale] in what 
concerns the relations between the Church and governments and the whole civil order.14 
                                                                
10   JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM, 11, 12 (1954) available at 
http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/library/Murray/1954d.htm. 
11   The Vatican’s English translation of the Declaration is available at 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html.  Unless otherwise noted, all additional English-language 
quotations of Vatican documents will be from the translations available on the Vatican website.  Latin-
language quotations are also taken from the Vatican website. 
12   Noonan, supra note 4, at 348-53. 
13  RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD 232, 231 
(2003). 
14 Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae No. 13 (Dec. 7, 1965).  “Inter ea quae ad bonum Ecclesiae, immo ad 
bonum ipsius terrenae civitatis spectant et ubique semperque servanda sunt atque ab omni iniuria 
defendenda, illud certe praestantissimum est, ut Ecclesia tanta perfruatur agendi libertate, quantam salus 
hominum curanda requirat (32). Haec enim libertas sacra est, qua Unigenitus Dei Filius ditavit Ecclesiam 
acquisitam sanguine suo. Ecclesiae sane adeo propria est, ut qui eam impugnant, iidem contra Dei 
voluntatem agant. Libertas Ecclesiae est principium fundamentale in relationibus inter Ecclesiam et 
potestates publicas totumque ordinem civilem.” 
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According to the Second Vatican Council, then, the libertas Ecclesiae -- whatever its still-to-be-specified 
content -- is nothing less than the “principium fundamentale” governing relations between the Church 
and the entire rest of the world, and such freedom is called “sacred” (sacra) “because it is endowed by 
Christ.”15  This last point must not go unnoticed.  As we shall see, Dignitatis grounds the general right of 
religious freedom on the dignity of the human person, but the fundamental principle of the Church’s 
(sacred) liberty “stems from divine mandate directly, rather than via secondary causality.”16  
Immediately following its assertion that the libertas Ecclesiae is the principium fundamentale 
governing the Church and the entire civil order, including governments, Dignitatis proceeds to specify 
some of the content of that freedom, that is, what it is in the Church’s nature to do (with her freedom).  
That content, however, as well as the principium fundamentale itself, both of which appear in Article 13 
of the document, cannot be interpreted except in light of an apparently architectonic statement in 
Article 1 of the Declaration.  That statement, which I shall refer to as the “relinquit clause,” is this:  the 
Council “leaves untouched [integram relinquit] traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men 
and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.”17  The question, then, would 
seem to be what the “traditional Catholic doctrine” was and, furthermore, remains.   
As I mentioned above, the interpretive difficulties Dignitatis presents are impressive, and it is 
easy to see why the interpretation of the relinquit clause is potentially decisive and, therefore, acutely 
contested. If the document begins in Article 1 by leaving the tradition exactly where it stood, is the rest 
of the document, including the “principium fundamentale,” not just a restatement of traditional Catholic 
doctrine?   
As already noted, however, Dignitatis is widely celebrated and understood as “developing 
doctrine.”  Development of doctrine occurs as “insight grows into what has been handed down,”18 
moving from the general to the more particular in the articulation of the deposit of faith that has been 
handed down from the time of the death of the last Apostle.  The principal interpretive debate over 
Dignitatis concerns whether it merely restates doctrine, which would be the clear indication of the 
relinquit clause, or develops doctrine, notwithstanding the contrary indication of that clause.  
The former prospect -- of “leav[ing]” traditional Catholic doctrine “untouched” -- calls forth 
formidable creativity from those who wish to discover in Dignitatis a new doctrine on the question of 
religious freedom.  There can be no better example of this resourcefulness than what a young Father 
Joseph Ratzinger wrote on the question in 1966:   
 
Most controversial was the third newly emphasized aspect.  The text attempts to emphasize a 
continuity in the statements of the official Church on this issue.  It also says that it “leaves intact 
the traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and communities toward the one true 
religion and the only Church of Christ.”  The term “duty” here has doubtful application to 
communities in their relation to the Church.  Later on in the Declaration, the text itself corrects 
and modifies these earlier statements, offering something new, something that is quite different 
from what is found, for example, in the statements of Pius XI and Pius XII.  It would have been 
                                                                
15  Hittinger, supra note 13, at 233. 
16  Hittinger, supra note 13, at 233. 
17 “Pariter vero profitetur Sacra Synodus officia haec hominum conscientiam tangere ac vincire, nec aliter 
veritatem sese imponere nisi vi ipsius veritatis, quae suaviter simul ac fortiter mentibus illabitur. Porro, 
quum libertas religiosa, quam homines in exsequendo officio Deum colendi exigunt, immunitatem a 
coercitione in societate civili respiciat, integram relinquit traditionalem doctrinam catholicam de morali 
hominum ac societatum officio erga veram religionem et unicam Christi Ecclesiam. Insuper, de hac 
libertate religiosa agens, Sacra Synodus recentiorum Summorum Pontificum doctrinam de inviolabilibus 
humanae personae iuribus necnon de iuridica ordinatione societatis evolvere intendit.” (emphasis added). 
18   Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei verbum No. 8 
(Nov. 18, 1965).  My quotation is from the translation by Austin Flannery.  The Vatican translation is 
available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19651118_dei-verbum_en.html.  
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better to omit these compromising formulas or to reform them with the latter text.  The 
introduction (Article 1) changes nothing in the text’s content; therefore, we need not regard it as 
anything more than a minor flaw.19 
 
The man who would be Pope opted to mitigate the embarrassment of the relinquit clause by entering a 
plea to ignore it.20  Later, as Cardinal Ratzinger, he apparently rescinded that plea.21   
It should be uncontroversial to observe that not to reckon with the significance of the relinquit 
clause is profoundly to falsify the Declaration’s meaning, whatever that meaning turns out to be.  It is 
documented that the clause was included late in the drafting process.  It is also documented that its 
inclusion was necessary to the passage of the document by the Council Fathers.22  Without clearly -- if 
succinctly -- reaffirming traditional Catholic doctrine on Church and state, Dignitatis would not have 
emerged from the Council, and what did emerge from the Council states that it “leaves untouched 
traditional Catholic doctrine.”  This clause, then, would seem to provide a hermeneutical key to unlock 
the meaning of the whole document.   
On the other hand, however, the document does explicitly announce its drafters’ intention to 
develop doctrine:  “Over and above all this, in taking up the matter of religious freedom this sacred 
Synod intends to develop the doctrine of recent Popes on the inviolable rights of the human person and 
on the constitutional order of society.”23  No other document of the Council makes its intent to develop 
doctrine clearer. Genuine development does not include contradiction, however.  For present purposes it 
will be sufficient to stipulate that it is a basic principle of Catholic theology that genuine development 
excludes contradiction.24  Again, insight can grow, and new formulations are sometimes possible, moving 
from the general to the more specific.  Putative doctrine that contradicts earlier doctrine cannot, 
however, be treated as what it claims to be, viz., doctrine. 
What gives the interpretive question its particular salience, then, is the fact that the core of the 
traditional teaching on Church and state was in fact put forward by the Popes as doctrine, not as mere 
changeable opinion.  Even those who find something new in Dignitatis acknowledge this fact, which, of 
course, is why they insist that Dignitatis developed “doctrine,” rather than, say, merely adopted a 
different prudential view.  There can be no serious question but that the principles the Popes taught on 
what we now refer to as the Church-state problem were understood by those Popes to be permanently 
valid.  These principles, consistently and authoritatively taught, century after century, cannot be 
contradicted by later “doctrine,” though their application will of course vary over time.  Writing in the 
American Eccesiastical Review in May of 1953, Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani summed up the matter as 
follows: 
 
These principles [regarding Church and state] are firm and immovable.  They were valid in the 
times of Innocent III [1198-1216] and Boniface VIII [1294-1303].  They are valid in the days of Leo 
XIII and of Pius XII, who has reaffirmed them in more than one of his documents. . . .  I am certain 
that no one can prove that there has been any kind of change, in the matter of these principles, 
between Summi pontificatus of Pius XII and the encyclicals of Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris against 
Communism, Mit brennender Sorge against Nazism, and Non abbiamo bisogno against the state 
monopoly of facism, on the one hand; and the earlier encyclicals of Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, 
Libertas, and Sapientiae christianiae, on the other. 
                                                                
19   JOSEPH RATIZINGER, THEOLOGICAL HIGHLIGHTS OF VATICAN II 147 (1966). 
20   MICHAEL DAVIES, THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 204-05 (1992). 
21   Davies, supra note 20, at 205. 
22   Davies, supra note 20, at 169-74. 
23 Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae No. 1 (Dec. 7, 1965).   “Insuper, de hac libertate religiosa agens, Sacra 
Synodus recentiorum Summorum Pontificum doctrinam de inviolabilibus humanae personae iuribus 
necnon de iuridica ordinatione societatis evolvere intendit.” 
24   Davies, supra note 20, at  210-31.  It should be acknowledged that this principle is disputed.  See, e.g., 
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL DOCTRINE 
(2005). 
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“The ultimate, profound, lapidary fundamental norms of society,” says the august Pontiff [Pius 
XII] in his Christmas radio-message of 1942, “cannot be damaged by the intervention of man’s 
genius.  Men can deny them, ignore them, despise them, disobey them, but they can never 
abrogate them with juridical efficacy.”25     
 
What, then, are those ultimate and unchangeable norms that the Popes have taught?  What is 
the traditional Catholic doctrine on Church and state that cannot be contradicted?  And what 
development of doctrine, if any, did Dignitatis effect? 
 
 
IV.   Traditional Catholic Doctrine on Church and State 
 
Speaking in 1955, just two years after Cardinal Ottaviani wrote the language I have just quoted, 
Pope Pius XII -- whose 1942 radio-address Ottaviani quoted -- said the following to the Tenth 
International Congress of Historical Sciences in Rome: 
 
The historian should not forget that, while the Church and State have known hours and years of 
conflict, there were also from the time of Constantine the Great until the contemporary era and 
even recently, tranquil periods, often quite long ones, during which they collaborated with full 
understanding in the education of the same people.  The Church does not hide the fact that she 
considers such collaboration normal, and that she regards the unity of the people in the true 
religion and the unanimity of action between herself and the State the ideal.26 
 
If this unapologetic statement of the “ideal” sounds dated or even (as is more likely) outrageous to the 
modern ear, consider that Pope Pius XII “[did] not hide the fact” of it a mere ten years before Dignitatis 
was promulgated.   
The core of that permanently valid ideal is this: Church and state should be united -- without the 
one being reduced to the other -- in close cooperation.27  Pope St. Pius X summarized the traditional 
doctrine in his 1906 encyclical Vehementer nos: 
 
That the state should be separated from the Church is an absolutely false and most pernicious 
thesis.  For first, since it is based on the principle that religion should be of no concern to the 
state, it does a grave injury to God, He who is the founder and conserver of human society no 
less than He is of individual men, for which reason He should be worshipped not only privately 
but also publicly.28    
 
One could marshal countless papal texts setting forth, century after century, the doctrinal principle that, 
in a Catholic society, the Church has a divine right to be united to the state as the religion of the state,29 
but here it will suffice to quote a respected scholar’s summary of the doctrine: 
 
                                                                
25   Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, The Church and the State: Some Present Problems in the Light of the 
Teaching of Pope Pius XII, 123 AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW 321, 328-29 (1953). 
26   Quoted in Davies, supra note 20, at 179. 
27   See Rommen, “Church and State,” supra note 7, at 324-25.   
28   Pope St. Pius X, encyclical Vehementer nos No. 3 (1905), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_x/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-x_enc_11021906_vehementer-
nos_en.html .  My translation varies somewhat from the Vatican’s. 
29   See, e.g., George Shea, Catholic Doctrine and ‘The Religion of the State, 123 AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL 
REVIEW 161, 170-73 (1950).  The overwhelming number of Catholic philosophers, theologians, and 
canonists were in accord.  See id. at 161 n.1, 165 nn.18 & 19. 
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The formal, official, and exclusive recognition of Catholicism by the State in a Catholic society as 
its own one and only religion, in short, the establishment of Catholicism as “the religion of the 
State,” seems necessarily contained in the very notion of the State’s duty to accept and profess 
the true religion, therefore Catholicism, with its creed, code, and cult.  How else could the State, 
qua State, in truth accept and profess Catholicism, together with its tenet that it alone is the true 
religion.30 
 
In sum, the principal proposition of traditional Catholic doctrine on Church and state is that the Church, as 
part of her liberty, enjoys the right to be established as the state’s one and only religion.  
 
V.  The Church’s Powers, Direct and Indirect 
 
 
 Before turning to an important condition precedent to the Church’s being established, we should 
be clear about what the Church claims the powers to do.  While the discussion today sounds in terms of 
libertas, historically the focus was on potestas: what liberty the Church claims is to exercise power.  
Limitations of space allow only a brief summary of the two powers, direct and indirect, that the Church 
has claimed over the centuries. 
 The Church’s indirect power refers to her right of authority to declare null and void putative civil 
laws that violate the natural law or the divine law.   Summing up centuries of papal teaching and other 
reflection on the indirect power, Jacques Maritain explains that  
 
[t]he Church has thus a right of authority over the political or the temporal itself, not because of 
political things, but because of the spiritual principle involved.  One sword is under the other:  not 
to be oppressed in it own sphere, but to be controlled and directed by the upper sword as 
regards the latter’s own sphere.  The special interventions of the spiritual in temporal matters 
are motivated by one object only, the avoidance or repression of sin. . . .  [I]t is the ratio peccati 
which is alleged by Innocent IV against Frederick II and by Boniface VIII against Philip the Fair.  
The ratio peccati is the essential justification for the intervention of the Church in temporal 
affairs.  This doctrine is unchangeable. . . .  Anyone paying sufficient attention to the substance of 
things underlying the various incidents of history will perceive that one same teaching is 
imparted by Boniface VIII in the Bull Unam Sanctam and by Leo XIII in the Encyclical Immortale 
Dei; and for a complete idea of the indirect power, both these great documents should be 
simultaneously borne in mind.31 
 
This power, Maritain explains, “extends as far as the primacy of the spiritual requires; for the Church is 
not disarmed, her right is effective and efficient.”32 
The indirect power is derivative of the direct power, and the latter is exactly the right of authority 
of the Church to exercise a real jurisdiction over certain people (e.g., clerics) and certain subject matter 
(dogma, sacraments, doctrine on natural law, etc.).  The point to underscore is that the Church’s direct 
power over herself is every bit as a real as the state’s power over itself.  When Pope Gelasius wrote that 
“there are two things by which this world is chiefly governed: the sacred authority of the pontiffs and the 
power of kings,” he was not claiming that the world is ruled by kings but merely exhorted by a 
                                                                
30   Id. at 167-68 
31 JACQUES MARITAIN, THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT CAESAR’S 12-13 (1930).  Maritain later defended a position that 
contradicts what he had judged to be “unchangeable doctrine,” but although Maritain changed his mind, 
the “unchangeable doctrine” remained unchanged. 
32 Id. at 15.  The classic formulation of the doctrine of the indirect power is by St. Robert Bellarmine in On 
the Temporal Power of the Pope, Against William Barclay, in STEFANIA TUTINO, ON TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL 
AUTHORITY 185-90 (2012).  On the foundations of Bellarmine’s account of the indirect power, see STEFANIA 
TUTINO, EMPIRE OF SOULS: ROBERT BELLARMINE AND THE CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH 9-47 (2010). 
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jurisdiction-less voluntary association known as the Church.  Pope Leo XIII restated the two powers 
doctrine in the encyclical Immortale Dei:   
 
God has divided between the ecclesiastical and the civil power the task of procuring the well-
being of the human race. He has appointed the former to divine, the latter to human things.  
Each of them is supreme in its own sphere (utraque potestas est, in genere suo, maxima); each is 
enclosed within perfectly defined boundaries, delimited in exact conformity with its nature and 
principle.  Each is therefore circumscribed within a sphere in which it can act and move in virtue 
of its own peculiar laws.33 
 
The Code of Canon Law promulgated in 1983 continues to make unmistakable the Church’s claim to be a 
perfect society that exercises a real jurisdiction through law, one that limits and bounds the state.34  This 
is the stuff of scandal, not agreement. 
 
VI.  In a Catholic Society 
 
 
Returning to the proposition that the Catholic Church enjoys a divine right to be the only 
established religion of the state, it is, as I mentioned, subject to an important condition precedent.  That 
condition appears quite matter-of-factly in the block quotation at the end of Section IV:  “in a Catholic 
society.”  Where the people and its leaders are not Catholic, it would be nonsense to suggest that the 
state should establish the Catholic religion.  It is, in fact, ordinarily through the people and those that they 
designate as their civil authorities that the rights of the Catholic Church are discovered and given effect.35  
The claim one hears frequently today, that states are in principle “incompetent” to recognize the truth of 
the Catholic religion, is sheer prejudice.  Our present government may be incompetent in the sense of 
using the faculty to know the truth poorly, but the failure is not on the ontological level.  It is a separate 
question, calling for a context-specific judgment, as to the fraction of a particular people and its leaders 
that must be Catholic before the obligation to establish the Catholic religion attaches.36   
Needless to say, it does not remotely attach in the United States today.  My topic, though, is 
what the Church teaches regarding the libertas Ecclesiae, and that teaching in its fullness is not restricted 
to its application here and now.  My account would be incomplete, however, if I did not add that it is the 
traditional judgment that any society that is not Catholic and therefore cannot mount a Catholic state is in 
a deficient situation, here in the words of Pope St. Pius X: 
 
[T]he City cannot be built otherwise than has God has built it; society cannot be set up unless the 
Church lays the foundations and supervises the work; no, civilization is not something yet to be 
found, nor is the New City to be built upon hazy notions; it has been in existence and still is: it is 
Christian civilization, it is the Catholic City.  It has only to be set up and restored continually 
against the unremitting attacks of insane dreamers, rebels and miscreants.  OMNIA INSTAURARE 
IN CHRISTO.37 
 
                                                                
33   Quoted in Maritain, supra note 31, at 5-6.   
34   See Russell Hittinger, Dignitatis Humanae, Religious Liberty, and Ecclesiastical Self-Government, 68 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1053 n.117 (1999). 
35   “That the state finds the Church in this wise, indirectly, through the medium of the Catholic citizenry, 
does not mean that the state has no direct duties towards the Church.”    Shea, supra note 29, at 167. 
36   See E.A. GOERNER, PETER AND CAESAR: POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 153-72 (1965). 
37   Pope St. Pius X, Apostolic Exhortation Notre Charge Apostolique No. 11 (1910), available at 
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius10/p10notre.htm.  This document, which the online reference just 
given erroneously categorizes as an encyclical, is not available on the Vatican website. 
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This is not an eccentric position to hold, at least not historically.  St. Augustine held that no society can be 
truly just without the true religion.38 
 
VII.  Novelty, at Vatican II? 
 
 Having now unpacked the lion’s share of the contents of the relinquit clause, we are almost in 
position to return to and follow the line of argument of Dignitatis.  First, however, an anticipatory 
summary is in order.  After loquaciously claiming that the libertas Ecclesiae is the principium 
fundamentale between the Church and state, Dignitatis fails to go on to make anything remotely 
resembling the traditional claim that the Church has the right, in a Catholic society, to be established as 
the religion of the state, to exercise a direct power of jurisdiction in all her spheres of action, and to 
exercise the indirect power with respect to the state.  Loquacious is not the same as adequate, and it 
must be admitted that Dignitatis’s appearance of unequivocal insistence on the libertas Ecclesiae is, at 
best, misleading.  Many of the most decisive aspects of that libertas as traditionally understood in 
unchangeable doctrine are missing from Dignitatis.  Where the document has occasion to draw important 
implications of the relinquit clause, it is virtually silent.  Silence does not work contradiction, but it can 
mislead – and intentionally so. 
What the document does claim can be usefully (if clunkily) divided into three categories: positive, 
what the Church has a right to; equivocal, what the Church sort of has a right to; and negative, what the 
Church does not have a right to.       
 In the positive category, Dignitatis claims the following for the Church: 
 
In human society and in the face of government, the Church claims freedom for her self in her 
character as a spiritual authority, established by Christ the Lord.  Upon this authority there rests, 
by divine mandate, the duty of going out into the whole world and preaching the gospel to every 
creature.  The Church also claims freedom for herself in her character as a society of men who 
have the right to live in society in accordance with the precepts of Christian faith.39 
 
Dignitatis goes on to state that for fulfilling her divine mandate, “independence is precisely what the 
authorities of the Church claim in society.”  It is the Church’s “duty,” Dignitatis continues, “to give 
utterance to, and authoritatively to teach, that Truth which is Christ Himself, and also to declare and 
confirm by her authority those principles of the moral order which have their origin in human nature 
itself.”40  The Church’s freedom and that of the individuals is to be protected by “constitutional law.”41 
In the equivocal category, I place the following one-sentence paragraph that John Courtney 
Murray described as “carefully phrased”42 but that might better be described as irritatingly and 
irresponsibly elliptical: 
 
If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among certain peoples, special legal recognition is 
given in the constitutional order of society to one religious body, it is at the same time 
imperative that the right of all citizens and religious bodies to religious freedom should be 
recognized and made effective in practice.43 
 
                                                                
38   Augustine of Hippo, The City of God, XIX, 25. 
39   Dignitatis humanae, supra note 14.  
40  Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae No. 14 (Dec. 7, 1965). 
41   Dignitatis humanae, supra note 14.  
42   THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II IN A NEW AND DEFINITIVE TRANSLATION 685 n.17 (Walter M. Abbot ed., 1966). 
43   See Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae No. 6 (Dec. 7, 1965). “Si attentis populorum circumstantiis 
peculiaribus uni communitati religiosae specialis civilis agnitio in iuridica civitatis ordinatione tribuitur, 
necesse est ut simul omnibus civibus et communitatibus religiosis ius ad libertatem in re religiosa 
agnoscatur et observetur.” 
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What seems unmistakable in this paragraph is the Council’s intent that the right of “religious freedom” 
can sometimes operate as a limit on the establishment of a religion, presumably even the Catholic 
religion.  It seems that establishment, even of the Catholic religion, is to be limited by the duty to respect 
religious minorities.  What is less easy to discern is when, provided that that condition is respected, 
religion, including the Catholic religion, should be given special legal recognition.  Glossing this text, John 
Courtney Murray opined that “the Council wished to insinuate that establishment, at least from the 
Catholic point of view, is a matter of historical circumstance, not of theological doctrine.”44   
 Murray, of course, had spent many years before the Council trying to demonstrate that the 
principles of traditional Catholic teaching on Church and state no longer apply, and these exertions may 
have contributed to his misreading of Dignitatis on the last point.  It was Murray’s “personal thesis” that 
Dignitatis “renounces all special privileges and establishments for the Church,” but, as Russell Hittinger 
has observed, “[i]n this case, Murray was wrong.”45  The one-sentence paragraph of Dignitatis specifically 
allowing “special legal recognition” does not bear the reading Murray gave it, nor does any other text of 
the Council support Murray’s misreading.  Such a misreading, furthermore, would not only contradict 
tradition – a sufficient ground for ruling it out; it would also suffer the embarrassment of contradicting 
something Dignitatis itself teaches quite clearly and strongly.  Specifically, as already noted, Dignitatis 
“insists that the Church’s liberty derives first from Christ (hence, the principium fundamentale), and also 
(etiam) from her character as a society of men.”  What Murray sought to write off as (mere) “historical 
circumstance” was, on the contrary, and as already noted above, a matter of “theological doctrine,” a 
point even Dignitatis itself acknowledged, if in conjunction with the additional ground (to which we shall 
return) that the Church is “a society of men.” It is the judgment of Russell Hittinger, pace Murray, that the 
Declaration’s “position on religious liberty would probably count as favoring the establishment of 
religion.”46   
    In the negative category, finally, falls the proposition for which Dignitatis is most widely 
celebrated.  In order to take the measure of this proposition, it will be useful to start by clarifying the 
context.  We can stipulate that traditional Catholic teaching clearly and consistently maintained the 
following three principles, even if, alas, historical practice did not always conform to them: 
 
1. No one must be forced to act against his conscience in private. 
2. No one must be forced to act against his conscience in public. 
3. No one must be forced to act against his conscience in public or in private, but may be 
forced to act against his conscience when the matter involves a violation of natural law and 
civil authorities determine that it would be in the interest of the common good to do so. 
 
These three rights of individuals and groups limit the action of both Church and state.  The quaestio 
disputata is whether Dignitatis adds the following fourth principle – either as a development of doctrine 
or as a prudential teaching -- to the list of the three traditional principles: 
 
4. No one may be prevented from acting in accordance with his conscience in public, provided 
the “public order” is not violated.47 
 
Such a principle (Principle 4), if valid doctrine, would deny the Church the right to insist, under proper 
circumstances, that the Catholic religion alone be practiced in public; correlatively, it would also disallow 
the state from permitting only the Catholic religion to be practiced in public.  The question, then, is 
whether the libertas Ecclesiae is limited and reduced by a competing right of “religious freedom” in public. 
 
VIII.  “Deliramentum” 
                                                                
44   Abbott, supra note 42, at 685 n.17. 
45   Hittinger, supra note 34, at 236. 
46   Hittinger, supra note 34, at 239. 
47 The language of these three propositions is borrowed, with only slight but important modification, from 
Davies, supra note 20, at 19, 211. 
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 Prior to the Council there was among Catholic theologians what John T. Noonan, Jr., has 
described as “unanimity” against the possibility of such a right to “religious freedom” in public.  The 
theologians were united, Noonan explains, because “they followed what [Pope] Gregory XVI had taught in 
Mirari vos, what Pius IX, following Gregory XVI, had taught in Quanta cura, what Leo XIII in the wake of his 
predecessors had proclaimed in Immortale Dei.”48  What Gregory had declared that had been followed 
boils down to this:  “From [the] most foul fruit of indifferentism flows that absurd and erroneous opinion, 
or rather, madness, that freedom of conscience must be affirmed for everyone.”49  Noonan comments: 
“Deliramentum, meaning ‘madness,’ is the term used by both Gregory XVI and Pius IX.  It is sometimes 
softened by being translated ‘aberration’; but ‘madness’ is what Gregory XVI chose to call liberty of 
conscience; and Pius IX repeated the term in Quanta cura.”50   
  In the middle of and amidst the bloodiest century of human history, however, the Fathers of the 
Second Vatican Council divined that “[a] sense of the dignity of the person” – from which the Declaration 
takes its very name – “has been impressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of 
contemporary man,”51 and that that dignity requires “religious freedom.”52  In what has been described 
as “the most important article” of Dignitatis, Article 2, one reads the following: 
 
This Vatican Synod declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom.  This 
freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of 
social groups and of any human power, in such wise that in matters religious no one is to be 
forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs. 
 
As Michael Davies notes, “[u]p to this point everything can be reconciled with traditional doctrine.”53  The 
same holds for the language that immediately follows: 
 
Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs, whether privately . 
. .  
 
But then comes this: 
 
. . .  or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits.54 
 
Even here harmony with traditional doctrine could have been maintained if “within due limits” were 
specified as “the common good,” for the common good was indeed the traditional criterion according to 
which the state was to determine what to allow and what to forbid.   
This last point merits emphasis and unpacking.  As understood in the tradition of Catholic 
political theory, the common good as the object of state action included not just public order, nor just the 
temporal common good, but also the supernatural common good.55   The traditional doctrine, without 
confusing or conflating Church and state, assured that Church and state worked in concert, wherever and 
to the extent possible, for the achievement of the two common goods in which humans by God’s design 
are called and commanded to participate.  As Henri De Lubac (whom Pope Paul VI wished to create a 
Cardinal and whom Pope John Paul II did create a Cardinal, in each case for his theological work) 
explained, “[the Church’s] power is spiritual in its object, as in its nature and its end; but it extends 
                                                                
48   Noonan, supra note <>, at 27. 
49   Pope Gregory XVI, encyclical Mirari vos, No. 14. 
50   Noonan, supra note <>, at 360. 
51   Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae No. 1 (Dec. 7, 1965). 
52   “The Synod further declares that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of 
the human person . . . .”. Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae No. 2 (Dec. 7, 1965). 
53   Davies, supra note 20, at 211. 
54   Davies, supra note 20, at 211. 
55   Davies, supra note 20, at 63-67. 
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nonetheless for that to all this is human, for it extends to all that is spiritual in every human affair in which 
it is engaged.”56  On the traditional view, the state must adhere to the Church’s judgment on what is 
necessary in all that touches man’s sacredness.57     
Aware of all of this, the drafters of Dignitatis deliberately rejected “the common good”58 in favor 
of the much more limited notion “public order:” 
 
The right to religious freedom is exercised in human society; hence its exercise is subject to 
certain regulatory norms. . . .  [S]ociety has the right to defend itself against possible abuses 
committed on pretext of freedom of religion.  It is the special duty of government to provide this 
protection. . . .  These norms arise out of the need for effective safeguard of the rights of all 
citizens and for peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights.  They flow from the need for an 
adequate care of genuine public peace, which comes about when men live together in good 
order and in true justice.  They come, finally, out of the need for a proper guardianship of public 
morality.  These matters constitute the common welfare: they are what is meant by public order. 
 
For the rest, the usages of society are to be the usages of freedom in their full range.  These 
require that the freedom of man be respected as far as possible, and curtailed only when and in 
so far as necessary.59 
 
 
Commenting on the last two-sentence paragraph, Murray opined that  
 
Secular experts may well consider this to be the most significant sentence in the Declaration.  It is 
a statement of the basic principle of the “free society.”  The principle has important origins in the 
medieval tradition of kingship, law, and jurisprudence.  But its statement by the Church has an 
accent of blessed newness – the newness of a renewal of the tradition.60 
 
The third quoted sentence is actionable: Murray knew perfectly well that this origin also includes a 
fundamental relationship to the common good.  The free society and the limits on civil ruling power are 
all discussed in light of the purpose of society, viz., the common good.  Be that as it may, the “newness” of 
the retreat from the common good was not lost on Paul Blanshard, who wrote contemptuously of 
attempts to disguise change as “development.”  According to Blanshard, Dignitatis represented “a great 
advance in Catholic policy, perhaps the greatest single advance in principle during all four sessions of the 
Council.”61  He continues:  “The star of the American delegation was John Courtney Murray, whose chief 
function was to give the pedestrian bishops the right words with which to change some ancient doctrines 
without admitting that they were being changed.”62  A broken clock is right twice daily. 
 
  
IX.  In Public? 
 
What exactly it means to “renew[]” tradition with “newness” has been debated ever since 
Murray boasted of it.  Murray certainly knew how to turn a phrase, but the doctrinal question is whether 
                                                                
56   HENRI DE LUBAC, THE SPLENDOR OF THE CHURCH 198 (Michael Mason trans., 2d ed. 1986).   
57   Id. at 193-94 n.127.  For a complementary perspective on the Church’s understanding of the range of 
her jurisdiction, see Paul Horwitz, Freedom of the Church Without Romance,  __ JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY 
LEGAL ISSUES __ (2013) (“bringing the world unreservedly into the sphere of the Church”). 
58   On the drafting history that rejected “the common good” in favor of the “public order,” see Davies, 
supra note 20, at 191-97. 
59 Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae No. 7 (Dec. 7, 1965). 
60   Abbott, supra note 42, at 687 n.21. 
61   PAUL BLANSHARD, PAUL BLANSHARD ON VATICAN II 339 (1967). 
62   Id. at 87. 
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there has been contradiction rather development in the teaching proffered by Dignitatis.  On the answer 
to this question turns the scope of the liberty the Church claims for herself.  
One position (Position 1) is that the teaching of Article 2, which I have summarized as Principle 4, 
is authoritatively taught by the Council as a matter of doctrine in open contradiction of traditional 
teaching.  Those who hold this view speak of a rupture in the tradition, and adhere to the traditional view.  
A variation on this position (Position 2) acknowledges the contradiction between traditional doctrine and 
the teaching of Dignitatis in Article 2, but points out that Pope Paul VI, who closed Vatican II in December 
of 1965, stated that the Council was purely pastoral in nature and defined no new doctrines.63  On this 
latter view, Principle 4 is said to be a prudential concession to the modern world, not a change in 
doctrine.   
 Another position (Position 3), and by far the most common, is that what appears to be 
contradiction is instead “development,” a new understanding of what has been handed down and taught 
authoritatively.  As already noted, proponents of this view can indeed point to the fact that Dignitatis 
states its intent to develop doctrine. For his part, Murray confessed (without a trace of irony or 
compunction) that he had no idea what the principle underlying the touted development was: “The 
course of the development between the Syllabus of Errors (1864) and Dignitatis Humanae Personae 
(1965) still remains to be explained by theologians.”64   Others have struggled to specify a deeper principle 
that guided a development that avoids contradiction and thus avoids rupture.65  Where proponents of 
Position 1 see rupture, advocates of Position 3 see “development in continuity,”66 although on some 
accounts advanced for Position 3, rupture is almost admitted and celebrated. 67   
Proponents of Position 1 reply that Dignitatis does not develop traditional doctrine but, instead, 
contradicts it.  Here is the claimed contradiction: 
 
A non-Catholic possesses a natural right not to be prevented from the public expression of error, 
limited only by the just requirements of public order. 
 
A non-Catholic does not possess a natural right not to be prevented from the public expression of 
error, limited only by the just requirements of public order.68   
  
Dignitatis is celebrated as teaching the former.  The tradition plainly, authoritatively, and repeatedly 
taught the latter, even as the tradition also conceded that sometimes the state will prudently tolerate the 
public practice of non-Catholic religions, as Pope Leo XIII makes unmistakable here: 
 
The Church, indeed, deems it unlawful to place various forms of Divine Worship on the same 
footing as the true religion, but does not, on that account, condemn those rulers who for the 
                                                                
63  “Papal Brief Declaring The Council Completed,” in Abbot, supra note 42, 738-39. 
64  Abbot, supra note 42, at 673. 
65  See, e.g., Brian Harrison’s argument in ARNOLD GUMINSKI AND BRIAN HARRISON, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: DID 
VATICAN II CONTRADICT TRADITIONAL CATHOLIC DOCTRINE? A DEBATE (2013). 
66 On the hermeneutics of Vatican II, see, e.g., MASSIMO FAGGIOLI, VATICAN II: THE STRUGGLE FOR MEANING 
(2012).  It is a topic for another day that the business of choosing a hermeneutic never gets past the level 
of description to the level of the normativity of the tradition.  
67  The latter perspective is associated with the “Bologna school” of interpretation.  This perspective is 
criticized mildly but helpfully in AGOSTINO MARCHETTO, THE SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL: A 
COUNTERPOINT FOR THE HISTORY OF THE COUNCIL 637-57 (2010) (“tradition and renewal together”).  The best 
English-language account of what happened at Vatican II is Roberto de Mattei, The Second Vatican 
Council – An Unwritten Story (2012). 
68 Davies, supra note 20, 219-20.   
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sake of securing some great good, or of hindering some great evil, tolerate in practice that these 
various forms of religion have a place in the State.69 
 
The just-quoted passage is from Leo’s encyclical Immortale Dei, in which the Pope also states: “This, then, 
is the teaching of the Church concerning the constitution and government of the state.”  Dignitatis’s 
contradiction of authoritative teaching is hard to blink.70   
 One final position (Position 4) should be mentioned, and it brings us back to the “relinquit” clause 
of Article 1 of Dignitatis.  Some interpreters of Dignitatis argue, plausibly enough, that the entire text 
must read in light of Article 1’s affirmation of “traditional Catholic doctrine.” As Michael Davies has 
commented, however, “[i]t is all very well . . . to argue that the entire Declaration must be interpreted in 
the light of Article 1, but, surely, Article 1 must also be interpreted in the light of the entire Declaration.”71  
How is Dignitatis’s statement, for example, that “it would clearly transgress the limits set to [the state’s] 
power to were it to presume to direct or inhibit acts that are religious” to be read in a way that does not 
contradict the following statement by Leo XIII in Libertas humana:   
 
To judge aright, we must acknowledge that the more a State is driven to tolerate evil, the further 
it is from perfection; and that the tolerance of evil which is dictated by political prudence should 
be strictly confined to the limits which its justifying cause, the public welfare requires.72 
 
To take the relinquit clause for all it is potentially worth would be mysteriously to vaporize every 
celebrated statement that comes later (or earlier) in the document, or at least, as suggested in Position 2, 
to reduce every one of them to the status of prudential guidance for a time in which the possibility of 
Catholic states seems, as it does, to be next to nil.   
This is not the place to attempt a comprehensive resolution of this dispute about the doctrinal 
status vel non of Principle 4, and I specifically prescind from that question.73  Enough has been said to 
clarify how the terms according to which it gets resolved settle some of the scope of the libertas Ecclesiae.     
 
X.  Liberty Not the Fundamental Principle 
 
 Regardless of where exactly the boundary of that scope gets set, it will not be disputed that I 
have expounded what in contemporary idiom might be called (not altogether complimentarily) a “thick” 
concept of libertas Ecclesiae.   But why -- we must ask -- should the state accede to the Church’s demands 
contained in that concept?  As one commentator has observed unexceptionably: “Certainly, it would be a 
deplorable petitio principii to argue: ‘The civil rulers must yield to the Church’s demands, because the 
Church so decrees.’”74   How, then, to defend what the Church teaches about the libertas Ecclesiae 
without, in fact, begging the question? 
The argument of Dignitatis does encompass the so-called liberal pluralist rationale for respecting 
so-called “mediating institutions.”  It does so in the following language, which I first quoted in Section [] of 
                                                                
69  Pope Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei No. 36 (1885), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_01111885_immortale-
dei_en.html.    
 
70   Davies, supra note 20, at 223-24. 
71   Davies, supra note 20, at 214. 
72   Davies, supra note 20, at 214-15. 
73   For present purposes, “[a]ll that I wish to do is to state that I do not see how the traditional teaching 
and that of Dignitatis humanae can be reconciled, which is a fact, and to ask the Magisterium to clarify 
the matter.”  Davies, supra note 20, at 227.  Emile Perreau-Sausinne’s book CATHOLICISM AND DEMOCRACY: AN 
ESSAY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (2012), while rich in insight concerning the forces at work at 
Vatican II on the question of “religious liberty” and persuasive on many points, does not address the 
pivotal question of how a “pastoral Council” can possibly “develop” doctrine.   
74  Francis Connell, The Theory of the ‘Lay State,’ 125 AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW 7, 10 (1951). 
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this paper:  “The Church also claims freedom for herself in her character as a society of men who have the 
right to live in society . . . .”75  As a general matter, I have considerable sympathy for the argument that 
associations having their own ends and ontological structure should be respected, helped when 
necessary, and not absorbed by the state.  This is the learning not just of contemporary liberal pluralists 
(such as Isaiah Berlin, William Galston, Richard Garnett, and John Inazu,) and of their antecedents (such as 
F.W. Maitland, J.N. Figgis, Harold Laski, G.D.H. Cole, and E. Barker), but it is also part of the social doctrine 
of the Catholic Church, wherein it is identified as the principle of subsidiarity (or, as it is sometimes called, 
the principle of subsidiary function).76  Arguments along these lines are the ones commonly advanced 
today where the freedom of the Church is defended as an aspect of a pluralist liberal democracy.   
To the extent that these arguments succeed in preserving some of the liberty of the Church, it 
may prove to be counterproductive to object to them or to oppose them.  Or it may not so prove.  The 
trouble is that they succeed, if they do succeed, at the high price of distorting or eclipsing the Church’s 
claim about something antecedent to herself: Christ.  To see this is to see what is, at best, insufficient in 
Dignitatis’s assertion, with which we began, that “[t]he freedom of the Church is the fundamental 
principle.”   
The Church is the mystical body of Christ, Christ-continued in the world, and it is at best 
misleading to say that her “freedom” is the fundamental determinant of the state’s obligation to 
recognize her. 
 
Freedom is not the fundamental principle, nor a fundamental principle in the matter.  The public 
law of the Church is founded on the State’s duty to recognize the social royalty of Our Lord Jesus 
Christ.  [The opposition we make between “liberty” and “the social royalty of Our Lord Jesus 
Christ” is not an opposition of contradiction but an opposition of “the whole and the part,” in the 
sense that the social royalty of Our Lord Jesus Christ does include the freedom of the Church in 
relation to the temporal power, but that liberty alone is not the whole of the doctrine of the 
social reign of Christ!]  The fundamental principle which governs the relations between Church 
and State is the “He must reign” of St. Paul (I Cor. 15:25) – the reign that applies not only to the 
Church but must be the foundation of the temporal City.  That is what the Church teaches, and it 
is what she claims as her first and chief right in the City.77  
 
Rather than the libertas Ecclesiae, what is fundamental is the social reign of Christ.  What is meant by this 
phrase is, in relevant part, that the civil ruler must submit to the Church’s judgment because it is the will 
of Christ the King – the “supernatural statute,” of which Murray spoke -- that the civil ruler submit to the 
Church speaking in the world in the name of Christ the King on matters touching the sacred.  The Church is 
possessed of legitimate ruling power, a real and final and God-given jurisdiction, not just directionless 
“liberty.”  Needless to say, liberal-pluralist arguments do not result in the indirect power by which the 
Church implements the will of Christ through the direct and indirect powers.  On the Church’s self-
understanding, however, she speaks not in her own name, at least not ultimately, but in the name of 
Christ, whose Mystical Body she is.  As Francis Connell explains, “if the Catholic Church possesses” – as 
she traditionally has claimed – “the authority to exercise jure proprio functions involving a restriction of 
the rights granted by the natural law to civil rulers, the only possible explanation of this direct power on 
the part of the Church is the authorization of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.”78  The exemplary case of this 
reduction of the state’s jurisdiction is the Church’s demand in Christ’s name that, in a Catholic society, the 
Church alone be established as the religion of the state.  What was left indeterminate by the natural law 
(viz., how God was to be worshipped) has been made determinate by Christ and the law of the Church, 
                                                                
75 Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae No. 13 (Dec. 7, 1965). 
76   See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine, in M. EVANS AND 
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77   MICHAEL DAVIES, APOLOGIA PRO MARCEL LEFEBVRE volume 2, 122 (quoting Lefebvre); see also Davies, supra 
note 20, at 181. 
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and, according to traditional Catholic doctrine “integram relinquit” by Dignitatis and the Second Vatican 
Council, this determination binds the state as a matter of higher law. 
A moment’s attention to an ongoing “public policy” debate will clarify the point.  The Catholic 
bishops of the United States are earnestly arguing that the big problem with the Patient Protection Act is 
that it interferes with “religious freedom” and – as they sometimes add – the freedom of the Church by 
compelling the Church to provide artificial contraceptives to those who are doing the Church’s work.  This 
objection is true but, for reasons already adduced, wildly incomplete.  The other problem with this law is 
not just that it forces us (Catholics or the Church) to do what we regard as in violation of the divine and 
natural law; it is not just that it forces us and others to do what we and they regard as in violation of those 
higher laws; the problem is also -- and above all -- that it forces us and others to do what violates higher 
law, the will of Christ the King, irrespective of who does or does not consider it to be a violation of higher 
law.  The mission and liberty of the Church is ultimately to transform the world and men’s souls in the 
image of Christ, not just to look inward and protect the internal life of the Church.  It is by divine right that 
the Church possesses jurisdiction over her hospitals; Leviathan does not. 
 
XI.  Tolerance and Intolerance 
 
   To state the obvious, we live in a world that is obsessed with “freedom” and “liberty,” 
understood, of course, in the negative sense of “freedom from.”  But, as John Garvey (among others) has 
reminded us, freedoms are for something.79  When the Church claims a right to freedom, she is, in this 
limited respect at least, in the same position as any other group or individual claiming a right to freedom: 
we can ask of her, and we should ask of her:  What is it for?  What is its justification?  In respect of the 
answer she gives, however, the Church is toto caelo different.  To put the point in its strongest form, it is 
ancient Catholic doctrine that “the world was created for the sake of the Church.”80  The Church’s 
ultimate claim for her freedom is to vindicate the divine will in the very ends of creation itself by her 
teaching, sanctifying, and ruling power in the world.  This is a claim that the culture does not accept, and 
for that reason, among others, the Church finds herself in the position of arguing for her freedom on 
grounds recognized by the liberal pluralist.   One must add, however, that there never existed a time 
when the Church could “count on peace”81 as she goes about her work of claiming the world for Christ.   
On what basis, then, can one defend the teaching Church’s own distance, in recent decades, 
from the doctrine of the social kingship of Christ?  Dignitatis is silent on this Catholic doctrine, as was the 
Second Vatican Council in its entire (prolific) corpus.82  Even Catholic liturgy has been rewritten to mute 
the traditional claims of Christ’s social royalty.83  Silence, however, does not effect reversal of permanent 
doctrine.  In any event, of course, the teaching-Church’s bashfulness about the social kingship of Christ is 
powerless to uncrown Him, though it is a powerful contributor to His being neglected. 
 A brief word of autobiography may be apposite en route to some concluding thoughts 
concerning tolerance.  Until several years ago, I saw only dimly the extent to which the foundation of the 
political order requires theological, not just philosophical, judgments and correlative commitments.  
Studying (and later reviewing) Michael J. White’s book Partisan or Neutral: The Futility of Public Political 
Theory84 was a start, as was my roughly contemporaneous work on human equality which, within the 
course of several years, moved from publishing a book titled By Nature Equal: The Anatomy of a Western 
Insight to confessing in an article that “[a]part from marketing purposes the book might well have been 
titled, By Super-Nature Equal.”85  Gradually but insistently my hope for an adequate political philosophy 
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81  De Lubac, supra note 56, at 194 (1989).  
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was overtaken by a judgment that political theology is not only appropriate but exigent.86  As a believing 
Catholic throughout, I eventually came to the understanding that, to adopt a phrase, “Catholicity [Is] 
Necessary to Sustain Popular Liberty.”87  As I went on to recover more and more of the Catholic tradition 
that had been hidden from me in my youth (in the 1970s and 1980s, in southern California!), I saw more 
and more the socio-juridical implications of my Catholic belief that the kingship of Christ is the only 
historical inevitability.  No matter now much we, as individuals or as a society, evade it, in the end “He 
must reign” (I Cor. 15:25).  Philosophy cannot succeed where Christ and His law must prevail.   
 On the traditional Catholic view, there is no completely principled middle ground between the 
demands of the social kingship of Christ and indifferentism. Catholics have always lived in the real world 
along with everybody else, though, and in every era some sort of modus vivendi is worked out.  The 
tradition has amply acknowledged the need for tolerance, even if too often individuals acting in the 
Church’s name have acted coercively when they should have shown tolerance.  In any event, no one with 
an adequate appreciation of the wrong of coercing a person to be baptized can, with consistency, oppose 
whatever tolerance the facts require or counsel.  Catholic states should be, and often have been, 
conspicuous for their tolerance of practitioners of and the practice of non-Catholic religions. It is too little 
remembered in the Whig narrative of history, for example, that it was Whigs who opposed James II of 
England’s “Declaration of Toleration.”  The Catholic position, of which James II was exemplary, defends 
generous and respectful toleration when prudence calls for it.  To claim a “right” to tolerance where what 
is proposed for tolerance would violate the common good, however, is another matter.  The point to 
underscore is that it is the common goods, natural and supernatural, not mere “public order,” that 
properly set the limits of tolerance.88   
It is of course obviously true that “we live today in the religiously neutral state.”89  Such 
neutrality, however, is in derogation from the Catholic ideal. The Catholic tradition denies John Locke’s 
contention that “[t]he magistrate as magistrate hath nothing to do with the good of souls or their 
concernments in another life, but is ordained and entrusted with his power only for the quiet and 
comfortable living of men in society. . . . .”90  Even Dignitatis, it should be remembered by that 
document’s Catholic champions and cheerleaders, teaches that government has “the obligation to 
promote the free exercise of religion.”91       
 If the consequences of this obligation sound ominous, consider for a moment that free exercise 
of religion for individuals, or even for groups, does not destabilize the unitary jurisdiction claimed by 
Leviathan.  Libertas Ecclesiae in action does, however, and this promises to be liberating.  Individuals 
cannot stand against the monolith state, as the Whiskey Rebellion, Shays’ Rebellion, and such like 
demonstrate.  Political subdivisions cannot do so, as the Civil War proved.  The Church alone is the 
ontological inruption into human history that can put the state, even an otherwise pretty good state, 
where it actually belongs.  It is therefore tragic that, in the heart of the century that produced the Fuhrer 
and generally exalted the unitary jurisdiction of the state, Dignitatis muted the Church’s ancient claim to 
exercise a real jurisdiction in all spheres of her action (sacraments, liturgy, schools, hospitals, etc.), in 
favor of building up individual religious liberty instead.  Only another perfect society possessed of a real 
jurisdiction can stand against the blitzkrieg of the “mortal God” Leviathan, and the good of souls requires 
nothing less of the Church.  I do not hope for a time when the Church will “be sufficiently nothing to live in 
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peace with the rest of the world . . . .”92  Widows, orphans, the poor, and many others whom the world 
loves not are among the intended beneficiaries of the Church’s demand that the state conform its ways to 
Christ’s.  Liberal opponents of the libertas Ecclesiae would do well to keep all of this in mind when they 
seek to marginalize or vaporize the Church.      
Ours is not remotely a Catholic society, and for that reason, among others, the Catholic state that 
is the ideal proposed by the Church is not at risk of coming into existence any time soon.   Many 
participants in the discussion at the conference at which this paper was presented were respectfully 
tolerant of the Catholic model’s challenge, at least at the level of theory, to the liberal model that 
currently enjoys a monopoly.  Others, however, made unmistakable that they considered the mere 
mention of the Catholic ideal to be an offense far more grave than “bad taste.”  I had committed the 
unpardonable sin of questioning the American civil religion, an irrefutable body of value judgments that 
operate at an axiological level.  To question them is to apostatize.  
I am by no means the first to observe the irony in the blazing intolerance of some self-styled 
liberals, nor am I the first to register the fact that “principled” liberal intolerance of illiberal positions 
demonstrates the terminal incoherence of liberalism itself.  As Nicholas Wolterstorff, himself a defender 
of the liberal state, has observed, “the resolve not to think about political issues in religious and 
theological terms has not produced agreement, either on principles or on practice.  The dream has 
failed.”93  It was a dream, and it failed.  Especially in light of that failure, there is no embarrassment in 
recovering and advancing political theology.  My present plea to the intolerant liberal is for him or her to 
recognize, at the very least, that the Church does not seek to aggrandize herself; she comes to do the will 
of Christ the King, whose right she seeks to vindicate.    
I shall conclude by suggesting that a modus vivendi that makes the room required for genuine 
and ample tolerance can consist with argument and appropriate action on behalf not only of “free 
exercise of religion,” but also of a principled Catholic society and, in turn, the Catholic state that such a 
society would help to realize.  The twain ends of a Catholic state are to help people be happy in this life 
and to get to heaven.  To offer such help – while never coercing the unbaptized to embrace the Catholic 
religion – is no less than justice requires, and it should also be understood as an act of love.  “There was a 
time,” wrote Pope Leo XIII, “when states were governed according to the philosophy of the Gospels.”94  
That philosophy, which is at the same time a theology, proclaims God’s loving will that all be saved (I Tim. 
2:4), and freely.  But “freely” does not mean without help, including the help of government that can act 
prudently but decisively on behalf of both common goods, natural and supernatural.    
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